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Introduction 
 
The origins of political protest and social movements have been debated for quite some time 
among scholars of sociology, psychology, political science and anthropology. Yet despite the 
overwhelming attention that is given to these subjects, there are still certain gaps in the literature 
concerning which factors lead to the onset of protests, riots, revolutions, and eventually the 
culmination of political violence in the form of civil war.  
The recent developments in the Arab world that are commonly referred to as the ‘Arab 
Spring’1 demonstrate this gap in the literature. Today, more than five years after the onset of the 
protests in Tunisia, there is still a fundamental lack of understanding of what caused the people of the 
Arab world to take to the streets. Being able to shed some light on the factors that have led to this 
phenomenon might suggest different approaches governments can assume when it becomes clear that 
their populations are ‘dissatisfied’, and thereby prevent further escalation that might even culminate 
into civil war – as the one that is still raging throughout Syria. Therefore, this thesis will contribute to 
the existing literature by attempting to provide an answer to the following research question:  
 
Which factors have led to the emergence of protests in the Arab Spring? 
 
Different Arab countries have experienced the Arab Spring in very different and distinct ways, 
both in terms of the level of protest as well as their eventual outcome.  In some Arab countries, major 
demonstrations numbering in the tens and hundreds of thousands have led to the overthrowing of the 
regime (Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen). In others the large protests were met with a strong reaction from 
the regime that has led to a militarized conflict (Libya, Syria and Bahrain). While yet others have 
experienced only varying extents of protest that were resolved by promises of reform or redistribution 
of material benefits (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco).  
The differences between the Arab countries in terms of protest and outcomes have intrigued 
many scholars, journalists and political analysts, creating a new body of literature that attempts to 
unveil this phenomenon. While some authors have managed to find and analyze several factors and 
attribute them to the emergence of protest in the Arab world (Eldin and Salih 2013; Byun and 
Hollander 2015; Hoffman and Jamal 2014), others argue that such (future) attempts should be avoided 
due to the distinct political and socio-economic natures of each country (Seybolt and Shafiq 2012; 
Brownlee et al. 2013; Huber and Kamel 2015). While the distinctiveness of the different Arab 
countries is not disputed, it seems nonetheless odd to reject the possibility of some common 
explanations in a region that shares very much in common.  
                                                     
1 Some would argue however that his term is wrong and prefer to refer to it as the ‘Arab Awakening’ or the 
‘Arab Uprisings’ (Eldin and Salih 2013; Costello et al. 2015).  
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Many of the recent studies of the Arab Spring demonstrate several shortcomings that stem 
from problematic theoretical frameworks or faulty methodological designs. Using a theoretical 
framework derived from the works of several scholars (Opp 2009; van Zomeren et al. 2008; Coleman 
1990), this thesis suggests a different approach to research of the determinants of the Arab Spring, as 
“explaining changing protests requires looking at changing incentives” (Opp 2009: 119). A decisive 
incentive in that sense, which is a crucial determinant of participation in protest, is opposition to the 
government (Petersen 2001; Coleman 1990; Opp 2009). 
Current research on the Arab Spring is primarily interested in economic and political lines of 
inquiry – arguing that issues such as financial satisfaction, unemployment and perceptions of 
corruption (along other issues) lead individuals to protest. These factors are indeed important, however 
not in determining actual protest, but rather in determining opposition to the government.  Using this 
growing body of literature, several hypotheses regarding the relationship between the different 
determinants of protest and support for the government are derived and tested.       
Since the hypotheses are concerned with individual incentives, the most appropriate data for 
investigating these relationships is survey data. The second wave of the Arab Barometer (AB)2 
provides survey data that was collected throughout 2011 – in the midst of the Arab Spring protests. 
The AB’s questions depict attitudes towards democracy and corruption, as well as economic 
evaluations and support for the government that are crucial for this thesis. Through binary logistic 
regression, each of the hypotheses is incorporated into a model that analyzes whether the different 
factors indeed influence support for the government.  
The results of the analysis show that several of the existing explanations of the rise in protest 
are indeed detrimental to government support, while other explanations are not supported. Evaluation 
of the economy, perceptions of corruption and to some extent the prospects of future employment, all 
seem to be quite important for the determination of government support. The most important 
determinant – as the analysis suggests – is whether a country is a monarchy or oil-rich, as individuals 
from these countries are generally less inclined to oppose their governments.  
While this explanation has been suggested by several authors to be linked with asserting 
legitimacy for the regimes in these countries (Brownlee et al. 2013; Seikaly 2014; Noreng and 
Alsahlawi 2015), the underlying mechanisms through which monarchies or oil-rich countries appear to 
be immune to the effects of the Arab Spring have not been thoroughly tested. In the conclusion of this 
thesis, I argue that future research should attempt to bridge the macro and micro levels, so as to 
provide more depth for explanations regarding the onset of protest.  
 
 
 
                                                     
2 Retrived from http://www.arabbarometer.org/instruments-and-data-files [viewed 26/2/2016] 
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Review of the Literature 
Theoretical Overview: theories of protest and social movements: 
 
How does one explain the onset of protest or other forms of collective action? This question 
has led to a prominent debate in several disciplines, from economics to political science. Van Zomeren 
et al. (2008: 505-9) note that explanations of collective action started from the assumption of  an 
objective state of disadvantage – where structural discrimination is argued to bring about protest or 
other collective action directed at ‘transforming’ a group’s status.3 These objective accounts have 
systematically failed to provide explanations for the onset of protests, leading to a shift towards socio-
psychological subjective explanations (Van Zomeren et al. 2008: 505) which are mostly incorporated 
in an implicit manner (Opp 2009: 1).   
Unlike the objective accounts, the more subjective socio-psychological accounts of collective 
action assume that “people respond to a subjective sense of disadvantage, which can (to some extent) 
appear to deviate from, and hence not necessarily flow from, the “objective” physical conditions” 
(Van Zomeren et al. 2008: 505). The subjectivity of perceptions is related to a point that is emphasized 
by the theory of collective action and one of its main scholars – Mancur Olson. Olson’s theory is 
concerned with explaining how the provision of a public good will (not) be achieved due to 
assumptions of rationality and self-interest of the actors involved. Namely, as a result of a cost-benefit 
analysis individual actors will result to free-riding and will not participate in collective attempts to 
provide a public good (Olson 1965; Opp 2009). 
Other approaches to the study of collective action have followed the path of socio-
psychological explanations, albeit each focuses on different aspects. Van Zomeren et al. make a 
distinction between three lines of inquiry that have dominated the collective action literature: 
perceived injustice, perceived efficacy, and sense of social identity (2008: 505). Perceived injustice 
stems from the literature on relative deprivation theory (RDT), which postulates that social 
comparisons lead to a “subjective sense of injustice” which is to be rectified through collective action 
(van Zomeren et al. 2008). Perceived efficacy is the building stone of the resource mobilization 
perspective and the value expectancy theory, where material resources play a decisive role – not only 
in initiating, but also in sustaining social movements (Van Zomeren et al. 2008: 506; Opp 2009: 114-
5; 127). 
Social identity theory (SIT) is also a prominent approach to the study of collective action. Its 
main argument is that individuals identify themselves with certain groups of which they wish to 
maintain a positive image (in their own eyes). However, when they compare their group with other 
groups, the positive image can be damaged due to perceptions of low social status (in a similar fashion 
to RDT). Such a situation is not satisfactory and will therefore lead to change: either by leaving the 
                                                     
3 For example, segregation in the United States included the structural discrimination of African Americans, 
leading to widespread protest directed at transforming the group’s status and elimination of the disadvantage.  
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group or alleviating its social status (through a collective action; Opp 2009: 7-8; Van Zomeren et al. 
2008: 507).   
Van Zomeren et al. propose a synthesis based on these explanations and argue that they are all 
bridged through social identity. The social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) and its 
propositions are generally supported by the meta-analysis of 182 studies on collective action. 
However, in their discussion of the implications for future research, the authors acknowledge a 
weakness in their model. They therefor call for “the examination of the potential interaction between 
objective and subjective variables” (Van Zomeren et al. 2008: 525). Such an examination came about 
in Karl-Dieter Opp’s book Theories of Political Protest and Social Movements. 
Unlike Van Zomeren and colleagues, Opp argues that the interaction between objective and 
subjective variables has been a crucial part of the study of collective action. The problem was however 
that this interaction was mostly implicit and was subjected to frequent criticism when addressed 
explicitly (Opp 2009: 16-7). This frequently implicit relationship between structural (macro) and 
cognitive (micro) factors forms the basis for Opp’s synthesis of theories of collective action in the 
form of the structural-cognitive model (SCM). The SCM is quite a complex model which cannot be 
completely elaborated upon in this context4. Opp offers a simplified model as well (figure 1). 
 
 
 4 
 
        1 3 
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Figure 1: the Structural-Cognitive Model (Opp 2009: 328) 
 
Arrow 1 in the figure represents the relationship between macro variables and micro factors; 
essentially how structural events affect the incentives of individuals (recall the earlier discussion on 
subjective perceptions). Arrow 2 indicates the change in the individual’s cost-benefit analysis through 
which participation in protest becomes more or less likely. Relationship 3 represents the aggregation 
of individuals’ actions and is therefore analytical. Relationship 4 then illustrates what many scholars 
argue to be a causational relationship, which is in fact a mere correlation (Opp 2009). 
                                                     
4 The SCM attempts to account for virtually all determinants of collective action. The full model (figure 11.1 C 
on p.328) includes eight relationships between different macro and micro factors (some causational and some 
correlational) borrowed from the most prominent theories of collective action.  
Macro/structural variables 
Micro/socio-psychological factors 
=Incentives 
 
Individual protest behaviour 
Collective protest events 
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 A similar model to Opp’s simplified SCM is ‘Coleman’s boat (see Coleman 1990: 10). One of 
the examples Coleman provides for the onset of a revolution is that improved social conditions 
(macro) lead to individual frustration (derived from unmet expectations; micro) which results in 
aggression, and the aggregation of aggression is the revolution (which is again at the macro level).5 
Coleman’s model is especially of importance due to his discussion of the revoking of authority (1990: 
466-83) and focus on “the change in orientation of subordinates in an authority system toward those in 
authority which leads to their taking action…” (1990: 469). Linking Coleman’s argument to the Arab 
Spring, it could be argued that in order to explain why citizens in the Arab world took action against 
their governments, there is a need to understand what led attitudes towards the government to change.  
 In a related notion to the determination of support for authority, Petersen’s (2001) study of 
insurgency mobilization shows that attitudinal opposition to the government is a precondition to actual 
participation in anti-regime activities such as protests: “other things being equal, the more one detests 
the regime, the more likely one is to accept higher risk in performing [anti-regime] actions” (Petersen 
2001: 8-9, 33). Following Coleman’s example, Petersen also notes that ‘simple’ frustration is a 
dominating mechanism in facilitating anti-regime sentiments and actions (2001: 33). 
 Through this discussion of the different theoretical approaches to the onset of protest, 
revolution and insurgency, one reoccurring theme seems to be the attitudes of individuals towards 
their governments. If an individual is supportive of the government, there is no incentive to engage in 
an activity that will compromise its position. While if an individual is opposed to the government (i.e. 
does not support it) there is an incentive to take action against it. Therefore, in order to explain the rise 
in protest in the Arab world, there is a need to explain which factors determine individual support (or 
the lack of it) for the government.    
 
 
The Case of the Arab Spring: previous accounts: 
 
Stemming from the theoretical approach discussed above, there is a need to discover which 
factors have determined government support in the Arab world and eventually led to the Arab Spring. 
Government support has not been discussed explicitly in the literature concerning the Arab Spring, yet 
one can assume that the factors that are attributed to the rise in protest are connected to government 
support. That is, if a certain factor is argued to cause protest, it can be argued that it initially leads to 
government opposition, which is in turn manifested in anti-regime actions.  
                                                     
5 This is an example which is derived from frustration theories of revolution, where frustration stems from an 
incompatibility between one’s expectations and actual conditions. Another example in social theory that follows 
a similar path is Weber’s study that shows how Protestantism (macro) leads individuals to have certain values 
(micro) that guide their actions, eventually resulting in the establishment of capitalism (again at the macro level; 
Coleman 1990: 13). 
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The different accounts of the Arab Spring bring forth various explanations for the onset of 
protest in the Arab world. In their article, Costello et al (2015: 90) group different explanations under 
the categories of “Bread, Liberty and Social Justice”, where each of the categories represents the 
different sources of grievances and discontent. A simpler and perhaps clearer categorization of these 
grievances is along economic and political lines. Issues such as rising food prices, increasing 
unemployment and economic inequality are grouped under the economic explanations. Issues of 
democracy, corruption, justice and human rights are grouped under political explanations.  
In their research, Seybolt and Shafiq’s (2012) hypotheses stemmed from the same 
categorization of economic and political grievances, with the addition of ‘opportunities’. Their 
findings indicate that no single explanation is applicable for the onset of the Arab Spring protests in 
the four countries they have studied, leading them to discourage further attempts of finding such a 
single explanation (2012: 22). This discouragement is then amplified by the findings of several other 
scholars, and can be demonstrated by the tendency to “reject the idea that the ‘Arab Spring’ is a 
unitary process and show that it consists of diverse ‘springs’ which differed in terms of opportunity 
structure, the strategies of a variety of actors and the outcomes” (Huber and Kamel 2015: 127). 
This new tendency has in turn led to a growing body of literature that no longer attempts to 
provide unitary explanations for the onset of protest. Instead, authors investigate case-specific 
explanations that focus on a single country (Bayat 2015; Beck and Huser 2015; Doherty and Shcraeder 
2015; Huber and Kamel 2015; Tufekci and Wilson 2012) or a small cluster of countries such as 
Tunisia and Egypt (Durac 2013; Hess 2013; Lesch 2014; Salamey 2015) or the Gulf States (Seikaly 
2014). 
Despite this tendency to break the Arab Spring into different ‘springs’, many other scholars 
still maintain that the different protests are not isolated from one another. The reason for this argument 
is that the Arab world shares many similarities, especially in the driving forces behind the protests 
(Noreng and Alsahlawi 2015: 161; Abdulla 2014: 36-7) and the existence of pan-Arabian sentiments 
(Gause 2011: 88). Some authors even go further to argue that “there is consensus… regarding the 
cocktail of major factors that… created the social explosion known as the 2011 Arab Uprisings” 
(Eldin and Salih 2013: 186).   
As noted earlier, one of the most noted explanations for protest in the Arab Spring stems from 
economic considerations. Here, issues such as income, unemployment, food prices and inequality, all 
bear their weight on an individual’s perception of both the country’s as well as personal financial 
situation. Most studies of the Arab Spring use objective measures of general economic performance, 
such as gross domestic product (GDP), percentage of unemployment and the Gini Index (Byun and 
Hollander 2015). However, a problem arises when these studies make assumptions regarding the 
relationship between these structural factors and individual protest. Namely, authors that employ such 
an analysis make the assumption that individuals engage in protest because of these measures. 
9 
 
However, it seems quite unlikely that protestors held signs calling ‘Increase Our GDP!’ or ‘Reduce 
Our Gini!’.  
Ianchovichina et al. (2015) argue that the protests of the Arab Spring could be explained by 
perceptions of well-being, as there has been a decline in such perceptions in the years preceding the 
Arab Spring. The authors then make the argument that the subsequent protests are a (direct) result of 
these perceptions. This is in line with the Opp’s SCM and Coleman’s boat: as individuals perceive a 
decline in their well-being, there is a growing incentive to improve it.  
According to Hess, this is especially the case in autocracies due to the ‘social contract’ (also: 
Beck and Huser 2015: 85-8) between the ruler and the subjects – the former can remain in power as 
long as prosperity is maintained. This is also why “autocracies with high per capita incomes have been 
remarkably highly resilient to collapse” (Hess 2013: 256). 
Since the government is considered to be responsible for the economic performance of a 
country, a negative evaluation of the economy (and expectations of worsening conditions) will result 
in opposition to the government. 
 
H1a: If individuals negatively evaluate their country’s economy, they will be more likely to oppose the 
government. 
H1b: If individuals have negative evaluations of their country’s future economic conditions, they will 
be more likely to oppose the government. 
 
Another prominent explanation within this realm is that the unemployed are expected to be 
more inclined to protest due to their dissatisfaction with current and future employment prospects 
(Costello et al 20115: 97-8; Hess 2013: 257-8; Salamey 2015). Despite the apparent logic of this 
proposition, several authors fail to find a relationship between unemployment and protest (Byun and 
Hollander 2015: 30; Campante and Chor 2014). Nonetheless, it will be interesting to test the 
proposition that negative prospects of future employment will lead to opposition to the government. 
Furthermore, this incentive can be argued to play a much stronger role among the unemployed.  
 
H1c: If individuals – and especially the unemployed – have negative evaluations of future employment 
prospects, they will be more likely to oppose the government.  
 
The other prominent line of inquiry is one that considers the effects of political grievances on 
the likelihood of protest. Political grievances are composed of issues of corruption6, democracy, civil 
liberties and justice. These factors are often measured using different indexes such as the Corruption 
                                                     
6 Corruption can be also seen as a feature of economic grievances, especially in the Arab world where is it 
closely related to income and employment (Seybolt and Shafiq 2012; Lesch 2014). 
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Perceptions Index (CPI),7 Freedom House8 and Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI).9 These measures 
suffer from the same problems demonstrated earlier in the context of economic measures, but to a 
somewhat lesser extent. Unlike the economic measures, indicators of corruption or democracy can be 
quite easily manifested in individual perceptions. Namely, if a country becomes more democratic or 
less corrupt, individuals should become more supportive of their government and have fewer 
incentives to engage in collective action in the name of ‘democratization’ or the ‘elimination of 
corruption’. 
Yet these measures are nonetheless objective and therefore cannot attribute directly to an 
individual’s actions (Opp 2009: 3, 57-68). The next step is to conceptualize such indexes “as potential 
facilitators or impediments to collective action to the extent that they are subjectively perceived as 
raising or lowering the group’s efficacy to achieve the group’s goal(s)” (emphasis added; Van 
Zomeren et al. 2008: 525).  
In his account of the causes of the Arab Spring, Hess (2013) uses the CPI to show that 
corruption was perceived to be widespread in Tunisia and Egypt – thereby generating the incentive to 
protest. Therefore, one can expect that perceptions of corruption will lead to opposition to the 
government – which then forms the incentive to engage in collective action for the provision of a 
desired public good (namely less corruption). 
 
H2: If individuals perceive government institutions to be corrupt, they will be more likely to oppose 
the government. 
 
 Measures of democracy can be argued to have a similar effect. When a country becomes less 
democratic, a certain ‘yearning for democracy’ arises (Doherty and Schraeder 2015), which results in 
negative attitudes towards autocratic regimes and positive attitudes towards elements associated with 
democracies. When an individual possesses negative attitudes towards an autocracy as a political 
system, it will lead to opposition to the government, creating an incentive to act in order to achieve 
more democracy (Costello et al. 2015: 96). Therefore, in autocracies:  
 
H3a: If individuals negatively evaluate autocracy, they will be more likely to oppose the government. 
H3b: If individuals positively evaluate democracy, they will be more likely to oppose the government. 
 
 There are also several determinants of protest that cannot be discussed entirely within the 
scopes of either economic or political grievances. For example, a structural argument that is frequently 
                                                     
7 https://www.transparency.org/ [viewed 13/3/2016] 
8 https://freedomhouse.org/ [viewed 13/3/2016] 
9 http://www.humanrightsdata.com/ [viewed 13/3/2016] 
11 
 
made is that mineral-rich countries, or ‘rentier’ states, are expected to experience less protests.10 This 
is because these countries have established certain political and social structures that are sustained by 
oil wealth (Noreng and Alsahlawi 2015; Brownlee et al. 2013; Costello et al. 2015; Seikaly 2014). 
This argument is generally supported by empirical evidence, but it nonetheless makes assumptions 
regarding the relationship between a structural factor and individual action without accounting for the 
incentives of the latter. A country’s oil wealth is supposed to reduce the likelihood of protest because 
it elevates financial satisfaction (through low taxes, redistributional policies and social benefits) and 
increases the costs of protests (through repression; Brownlee et al. 2013).  
 An argument that is frequently made in cahoots with the oil argument is that hereditary 
succession (specifically in monarchies) is also a factor that diminishes the likelihood of protests. The 
main driving forces behind this argument are maneuvering room (in terms of reforms and appointment 
of cabinets), appeal to popular legitimacy, and absence of a unified opposition (Costello et al. 2015; 
Brownlee et al. 2013). Therefore, it can be argued that the attitudes and perceptions discussed 
previously will bear little influence on opposition to the government in monarchies and oil-rich 
countries.  
 
H4: If individuals reside in monarchies or oil-rich countries, they will be less likely to oppose the 
government 
 
Another factor that cannot be completely incorporated with economic or political grievances, 
but has been ‘identified’ as a leading cause of the mobilization of protestors is social-media. The 
argument behind this factor is that platforms such as Twitter and Facebook made it much easier to 
organize protests and allowed people to express their dissatisfaction with the regime in a much larger 
forum. This factor has later been the subject of several studies that found evidence both in favor 
(Howard and Hussain 2011; Tufekci and Wilson 2012) and against (Byun and Hollander 2015; 
Costello et al. 2015) its role in influencing the outbreak or outcome of the protests. However, these 
studies mostly examined the role of social media at the country level, thereby neglecting to account for 
the effects social media has on individuals and their incentives.   
Such an effect can be manifested due to the reduction of costs associated with participating in 
protest, but the fact that costs of protest are reduced does not necessarily mean that protest will occur. 
In other words, social-media is a tool in the hands of the aggrieved to organize themselves and to 
instigate protests (Howard and Hussain 2011). Therefore, protest will become more likely only among 
individuals that are aggrieved by economic or political factors. One possibility is that the increased 
debate on these platforms can strengthen negative evaluations of the economy or autocracy as a 
political system, leading to opposition to the government.  
                                                     
10 This is despite the ‘oil curse’ which can lead to unemployment and increased inequality (Costello et al. 2015), 
and is sometimes perceived to be conductive for the emergence of civil war (Collier 2001). 
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H5: If individuals frequently use social-media, they will be more likely to oppose the government.  
 
 
Research design 
Data and Method 
 
To test the different hypotheses this thesis will make use of the AB. The AB is a representative 
survey which is conducted in the Arab world and is very similar to other value surveys such as the 
World Values Survey and other barometers (Euro, Afro etc.). Hoffman and Jamal find that “[T]he 
Arab Barometer provides the best source of data on political attitudes in the Arab world” (2012), 
making it very suitable for the goals of this thesis. In order to assess the perceptions and attitudes of 
individuals around the time of the protests, the analysis will make use of the second wave of the AB 
which was mostly conducted in 2011 – in the midst of the Arab Spring protests.  
The second wave was conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi 
Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen. However, due to several constraints, the following analysis will 
omit Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Sudan. The reason for this exclusion stems from these countries 
particular circumstances and experiences in that time period (Seybolt and Shafiq 2012: 16; Costello et 
al. 2015: 92).11 The remaining countries provide 7423 cases.  
The third wave of the AB, which was mostly conducted in 2013 and 2014, includes a specific 
section regarding the Arab Spring and even specifically asks whether respondents participated in the 
protests. However, using the third wave is problematic since between two and three years have already 
passed since the protests, making it quite problematic to argue that measures such as financial 
satisfaction (measured in 2013) determined participation in protest in 2011. Such an argument based 
on these two indicators will fail to comply with one of the necessary conditions for establishing 
causality (Halperin and Heath 2012: 369). 
These issues that are associated with cross-sectional surveys and retrospective interviews 
represent a significant limitation for drawing conclusions from them. They stem from the fact that 
“[B]eliefs and sentiments expressed at the time of questioning may be a consequence (rather than a 
cause) of protest” (Biggs 2006: 325). This is also related to the ‘pedestrian methodological defect’ 
(Green and Shapiro 1994: 85). This methodological defect entails that “surveys that ask people to 
recount the reasons behind such actions as joining an organization” can lead to skepticism regarding 
the findings, “particularly when the survey takes place long after the fact” (Green and Shapiro 1994: 
85; Finkel and Muller 1998: 37). 
                                                     
11 South Sudan’s independence in 2011 captured most of the political discourse. For Palestine the occupation by 
Israel and the continuing clashes remain a main issue. Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy that had already 
experienced a wave of protests in 2005-8. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has been under a continuing 
process of change which makes it quite different from the rest of the Arab world.  
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Nonetheless, several authors argue to have found solutions for these issues. Anderson and 
Mendes (2006) opt in for measuring ‘propensity to protest’, while Biggs incorporates “[V]ariables 
measured at time t1 … to explain the individual’s participation in protest between t1 and t2, 
controlling for protest prior to t1” (2006: 325). Finkel and Muller (1998) argue on the other hand that 
cross-sectional surveys cannot be used for inferring causal relationships. They argue that the only 
appropriate method for tapping into the collective and selective interests for participation is panel data. 
Yet this solution introduced new problems, as the low number of respondents in both waves was quite 
small, leading the authors to expand their research to activities other than protests.12  
Considering these limitations, the theoretical approach assumed in this thesis seems somewhat 
reassuring; instead of testing the determinants of past behavior using inappropriate data, the 
hypotheses and subsequent analysis link individuals’ current perceptions and attitudes to their current 
support or opposition to the government. Yet this approach also has its limitations, especially the fact 
that having incentives to engage in protest (opposing the government) does not automatically lead to 
actual participation (Muller and Jukam 1983: 176-7; Muller and Opp 1986: 484).  
   
 
Dependent Variable 
  
 The Dependent variable (DV) in all of the hypotheses is opposition to the government. The 
AB provides a range of questions that might be useful indicators of such a variable, including trust in 
and evaluation of different aspects of the government. But a question that I argue to depict the DV to a 
greater extent is question Q513, which asked respondents to indicate their satisfaction with the 
government, ranging from absolute dissatisfaction to absolute satisfaction. While satisfaction is not 
identical to support (nor is dissatisfaction identical to opposition), it can be argued that the aspects 
depicted in the hypotheses apply to satisfaction as well. If an individual sees autocracy as a bad 
political system, he/she will be more likely to be dissatisfied with the government and the regime since 
they are the manifestations of this form of political system – leading to opposition. This measure was 
recoded so that a value of ‘1’ will indicate satisfaction and hence support, while a value of ‘0’ will 
indicate dissatisfaction and hence opposition to the government.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
12 Finkel and Muller (1998: 41) created a dependent variable that combines the total amount of activities 
respondents engaged in. These activities ranged from signing petitions, ‘wearing a button for a public cause’ and 
other unconventional participation. Such a measurement introduces the risk that some respondents who 
occasionally sign a petition and/or wear a button are regarded as very active; while a respondent who engaged in 
a protest once is regarded as less active.   
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Independent Variables 
 
The Independent Variables (IV) in the first two hypotheses require measures of one’s 
economic evaluation and future expectations. The AB provides several questions that tap into these 
issues. The first question (Q101) addresses the Economic Evaluation of one’s country, to which 
responses range from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good’. This measure has been recoded so that a positive 
evaluation will be indicated by a score of ‘1’ while a negative evaluation will be indicated by a score 
of ‘0’. Q102 is also recoded so that Negative Future is coded as ‘1’ while other responses 
(improvement or no change) are coded as ‘0’.  
However, positive or negative evaluation of the economy cannot completely represent the 
range of influence of economic determinants on support for the government. Therefore there is a need 
to incorporate an additional indicator that will tap into the aspect of satisfaction. This could be 
achieved by including Q1016 which describes several statements regarding the household’s financial 
situation. This indicator has also been recoded so that Income Satisfaction is coded as ‘1’ while 
dissatisfaction is coded with ‘0’.  
Hypothesis H1c taps into the relationship between employment prospects and support for the 
government. The IV in this instance is provided by Q204(2) which asks respondents to evaluate 
government performance in ‘creating employment opportunities’. This variable has been recoded so 
that a value of ‘1’ indicates good performance (and hence Positive Employment Prospects) and a value 
of ‘0’ bad performance. Furthermore, the hypothesis states that the unemployed are more likely to be 
influenced by this incentive. However, the AB includes a large amount of housewives (2083 of the 
7423 cases) who do not necessarily seek employment, which might skew the analysis in an unexpected 
direction. Therefore a variable has been created from Q1005, where a score of ‘1’ indicates the 
respondent is either unemployed (looking for work) or a student. 
Hypothesis H2 requires a measure of perceived corruption. This is provided by Q210 of the 
AB which reads “Do you think that there is corruption within the state’s institutions and agencies?” to 
which the responses were recoded so that ‘1’ indicates Corruption Perception and ‘0’ indicates its 
absence.  
For assessing the relationship between evaluations of democracy and autocracy as political 
systems, hypotheses H3a and H3b use Q517(1/2) which presents the respondents with descriptions of 
both political systems and asks them to evaluate whether they are good or bad. This measure has been 
recoded so that a score of ‘1’ indicates a positive evaluation while a score of ‘0’ indicates a negative 
evaluation. The relationship between monarchies and oil-rich countries and support for the 
government (H4) can be tested using a dummy variable that indicates whether a country is a monarchy 
or oil-rich (Algeria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia coded as 1).13 
                                                     
13 The only two ‘true’ oil-rich countries in this sample are Algeria and Saudi Arabia, where rents from oil and 
gas as a percentage of GDP are over 30 percent. The only other country that comes close to this figure is Yemen 
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Finally, hypothesis H5 requires a measure that indicates use of social-media. The AB asked 
only respondents in Egypt and Tunisia whether they were active on Facebook (TE411). Another 
question that can indicate the use of social-media is the frequency of internet usage (Q409). Having 
correlated these two measures in Tunisia and Egypt, the Pearson score is an overwhelming .809, 
meaning that (in these two countries) measuring Facebook activity is almost equivalent to measuring 
frequency of internet usage.  
In addition to the IV’s that are expected to explain the variation in the DV, several other 
variables are also included in the analysis. Gender (coded ‘1’ for male and ‘2’ for female) has been 
shown to be a decisive factor as men were generally more likely to participate in the Arab Spring 
protests (Seybolt and Shafiq 2012; Hoffman and Jamal 2014). It will be interesting to see whether 
gender also influences opposition to the government. Age (Q1001) and Education are also included as 
some authors argue that protest was more likely among the young and educated (Costello et al. 2015; 
Huber and Kamel 2015; Tufekci and Wilson 2012). Education is measured by Q1003, which is a scale 
ranging from 1 (no formal education) to 7 (Master’s degree or higher). 
 
 
Empirical Analysis  
 
 Before the results of the regression analysis are presented and discussed, it is important to note 
a few limitations of binary logistic regression. First, the more IV’s used in a model the greater the 
chance of obtaining inaccurate results. Second, as with many regression analyses, outliers can distort 
the results as well. Finally, dependence among IV’s can also generate poor predictions.14 The 
correlations matrix (table 4 in appendix 2) shows that there is indeed some correlation between the 
different variables, but not to an overwhelming extent that will jeopardize the analysis.   
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of all variables, from which several findings can already be 
highlighted. Saudi respondents evaluate their economy much more positively than others, they are 
much more satisfied with their financial situation, are least likely to perceive corruption, and are more 
satisfied with their government. Other interesting findings from table 1 include Jordanians’ positive 
evaluation of autocracies and high satisfaction with the government, and the overwhelming lack of 
support for the government in both Tunisia and Egypt.15 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
with 25 percent, but due to its low GDP and higher energy imports, it was not coded as such. Data retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS [viewed 1/5/2016] 
14 http://www.clockbackward.com/2009/06/18/ordinary-least-squares-linear-regression-flaws-problems-and-
pitfalls/ [viewed 7/5/2016] 
15 The surveys in Tunisia and Egypt were conducted after the regimes of Ben-Ali and Mubarak had already been 
overthrown. This will be further discussed in the presentation of the results.  
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 Table 1: Dependent Variable and Independent Variables by Country 
      Variable            /              Country Algeria Egypt Jordan Saudi Arabia Tunisia Yemen 
Satisfaction with Government         
(% ‘satisfied’) 
28% 8% 52% 73% 4% 17% 
Economic Evaluation (% ‘positive’) 31% 24% 42% 70% 28% 21% 
Negative Future  (% ‘negative’) 25% 7% 41% 16% 6% 51% 
Income Satisfaction (% ‘yes’) 53% 22% 29% 70% 31% 19% 
Future Employment (% ‘positive’) 16% 25% 40% 47% 37% 16% 
Unemployed (% Unemployed and 
seeking employment and students) 
27% 8% 13% 18% 26% 24% 
Corruption Perception (% ‘yes’) 93% 82% 74% 66% 79% 94% 
Democracy Evaluation (% ‘good’) 87% 98% 91% 89% 98% 84% 
Autocracy Evaluation (% ‘good’) 5% 10% 28% 11% 5% 10% 
Monarchy/ Oil-rich Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Internet Usage (median) 3 1 1 4 1 1 
Age (mean)16 38 39 47 38 40 31 
Gender (% female) 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
Education (mean) 3.51 3.45 4.22 4.34 3.03 4.35 
N 1216 1219 1188 1404 1196 1200 
Notes: Data obtained from the Arab Barometer (2nd wave, 2011). Complete wording of the questions can be found in appendix 1.  
 
Table 2 shows the results of the binary logistic regression indicating the odds ratios (OR) for 
change in the DV. An OR of 1 indicates that there is no relationship between the IV and the DV, while 
an OR greater than 1 indicates a positive change, meaning that the higher the value of the IV – the 
more likely the DV score will be 1 (which in this case indicates support for the government). The 
results also include the Nagelkerke R Square (R2) score for each model – indicating the amount of 
variation in the DV that is explained by the model.   
The first two models test the relationship between economic aspects and government 
opposition. As the results indicate, all of the IV’s in these models are significant and in the expected 
direction, with economic evaluation being the best predictor with an OR of 4.115 – meaning that 
individuals who negatively evaluate the economy are more than four times more likely to oppose the 
government.  
The variation in the OR of the IV income satisfaction between the two models indicates that 
there is some multicollinearity between these variables, which is not surprising given the obvious 
overlap between them. All in all, the results of the first two models indicate that there is support for 
hypotheses H1a and H1b.  
 
                                                     
16 Age was included in all models, but omitted from the subsequent tables due to no variation. 
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The third model offers partial support for hypothesis H1c, as individuals who have positive 
future employment prospects are more than three times more likely to support the government. 
However, being unemployed or a student does not seem to affect the level of support for the 
government. This is surprising since these individuals should be most concerned regarding their future 
employment. Despite the high OR, the R2 result for this model is a mere .092, meaning that this model 
accounts for roughly nine percent of variation in the DV.  
Model four depicts the relationship between perception of corruption and support for the 
government. The relationship is quite strong and in the expected direction, as individuals who perceive 
government institutions to be corrupt are more likely to oppose the government. While the variable’s 
magnitude and significance are certainly apparent, the R2 of .064 seems quite low for an explanation 
that is so frequently mentioned in the literature as a determining factor of protest. 
Models five and six test the evaluations of democracy and autocracy as political systems. The 
evaluation of democracy does not seem to achieve statistical significance, but is in the expected 
direction. Evaluation of autocracy on the other hand, does seem to be more important for determining 
government support, as individuals who positively evaluate autocracy are twice as likely to be 
supportive of their government. These results suggest that it is not the ‘yearning for democracy’ that 
generates opposition to autocratic regimes – but rather the acceptance of autocracy that leads to 
continuing support.  
Model seven assesses whether individuals in monarchies or oil-rich countries are more likely 
to support their government. The highly significant OR score of 10.629 indicates that citizens in 
Algeria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are more than ten times more likely to support their government than 
citizens of Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. This high OR is accompanied by a R2 score of .293, indicating 
that this model accounts for almost thirty percent of variation in the DV. The eighth model does not 
offer support for hypothesis H5, as frequent internet usage actually increases support for the 
government rather than leading to opposition.  
The final model in table 2 includes all of the variables in a single model. Due to some 
multicollinearity among a few of the IV’s, the effect of most IV’s becomes weaker. The model’s R2 
score of .371 seems quite impressive, yet it still means that factors not included in the analysis account 
for sixty-three percent of variation in support for the government. Some variables, such as negative 
future and autocracy evaluation lose (some) of their statistical significance. Other variables such as 
internet usage even change the direction of the relationship – from having a positive influence to 
having a negative influence on support for the government.17   
 
 
 
                                                     
17 This change is also caused by multicollinearity. In this case a correlation of .313 with the variable Monarchy/ 
Oil-rich.  
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In order to assess whether these explanations hold in the individual countries, the full model 
has been tested in each of them. Looking at table 3 as a whole, it appears that none of the hypotheses 
are supported in Egypt, and in Tunisia only the evaluation of democracy and autocracy seem to have 
influence on the determination of opposition to the government. This is probably a result of the very 
low levels of support for the regimes in both countries (8% in Egypt and 4% in Tunisia). This finding 
is quite problematic as it raises the question of whether the results in table 2 were tempered by this 
issue.18  
In Egypt, two of the control variables seem to be far more important in determining the 
likelihood of opposing the government than other explanations. Higher levels of education increase the 
likelihood of opposing the government, and female respondents were more likely to support the 
government. Tunisia is the only country that provides support for both H3a and H3b, as positive 
evaluation of democracy and negative evaluation of autocracy increase the likelihood of opposition. 
The models in Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, also show some variation in the 
explanatory power of the different IV’s. Evaluation of the economy and perceptions of corruption 
seem to be crucial for determining the likelihood of opposing the government in all four countries. 
Having negative evaluations of future economic conditions only seems to be important in Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen, and to a lesser extent in Jordan. Income satisfaction only applies in Algeria and 
Yemen. Future employment prospects are important in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Evaluations 
of democracy and autocracy are not significant in any of these four countries, and internet usage 
increases the likelihood of opposition in Algeria (and nears significance in Yemen).  
Model sixteen in table 3 combines all of the countries that have been classified as 
monarchy/oil-rich. The results are not very different from the original full model, with the only 
notable exception of autocracy evaluation becoming insignificant (stemming from the exclusion of 
Tunisia). 
 
Discussion 
 
 The results of the analysis provide some interesting insights regarding the different hypotheses 
and their respective indicators. The lack of support for almost all hypotheses in Tunisia and Egypt are 
quite alarming, but as noted earlier this might stem from the overwhelming opposition to the (already 
overthrown) governments in these countries. When these two countries are excluded from further 
consideration, it can be argued that the hypotheses regarding the effects of economic evaluation and 
perceptions of corruption are generally supported. Other explanations are only supported in a few 
                                                     
18 For this reason, an additional analysis was conducted where Egyptian and Tunisian respondents were omitted. 
As the results in table 5 (appendix 2) suggest, this is somewhat the case as the OR’s in the different models 
demonstrate some variation, and in one model (5) the relationship changed directions. But in general, the results 
in this analysis become even stronger (except monarchy/oil-rich), providing even more support for most 
hypotheses.  
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countries – indicating that some of the explanations are only applicable in certain country-specific 
settings (as several authors have suggested; Seybolt and Shafiq 2012; Brownlee et al. 2013; Huber and 
Kamel 2015).  
 As Opp’s model suggests, these country-specific conditions can stem from various changes in 
the macro level. For example, consider the results of future employment prospects – which are only 
supported in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Why were Algerian respondents not influenced by this 
incentive? This question cannot be answered when the explanation is limited to the micro level. Only 
by incorporating macro level explanations that depict objective changes in these countries, will it be 
possible to show why certain explanations are only applicable in some cases (Opp 2009).  
 One such objective measure is unemployment, which might shed some light on why 
individuals in Algeria were not motivated by future employment prospects in their determination of 
support for the government. Figure 2 shows the change in unemployment in the six countries between 
2000 and 2010. The only country that is showing a continuing improvement in the field of 
unemployment is Algeria. The fact that only sixteen percent of Algerian respondents have positive 
future employment prospects (see table 1) might stem from the fact that much improvement has 
already been achieved – and that future improvement is perceived to be unlikely. But the fact that the 
government succeeded in reducing unemployment substantially over the course of the previous ten 
years does not lead respondents who have negative future employment prospects to be less supportive 
of their government. 
 
                     
Figure 2: Unemployment 2000-2010. The World Bank
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19 Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS [viewed 31/5/2016]. 
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While the explanation above certainly seems plausible, such a crude presentation of raw data 
without additional micro-level analysis is quite problematic. Nonetheless, this example shows that 
sometimes the answers for changes in individual incentives can originate from objective changes, as 
noted earlier in the discussion of Van Zomeren et al (2008) and Opp (2009). 
While the analysis showed the importance of certain factors for facilitating anti-regime 
sentiments, it is clear that not all dissatisfied citizens actually engaged in protest behavior during the 
course of the Arab Spring. The overwhelming lack of support for the Ben-Ali and Mubarak regimes 
raises questions regarding which individuals actually act upon these sentiments. While some scholars 
have indeed engaged in such research (Hoffman and Jamal 2012; 2014; Tufekci and Wilson 2012), 
methodological problems have prevented these explanations from becoming more prominent in the 
literature.  
  
 
Conclusion  
 
This thesis has set out to explain which factors have led to the rise in protest in the Arab world 
in 2011, in the phenomenon that is now generally referred to as the Arab Spring. Using the vast 
literature on the onset of protests and social movements, along with the growing literature on the 
causes of the Arab Spring, several hypotheses were generated regarding the relationship between the 
determinants of protest and opposition to the government. These hypotheses were in turn tested 
through binary logistic regression using data from the AB.  
The analysis yielded some interesting results, providing support for some hypotheses and to 
the rejection of others. While the extremely high levels of opposition to the Ben-Ali and Mubarak 
regimes have proven to be problematic for the analysis, it can nonetheless be argued that the role of 
economic evaluation and perception of corruption are highly important for determining attitudes 
towards the government. Even more so is the role of monarchies and oil-rich countries – which is a 
macro explanation that future research should attempt to provide more depth to.   
The failure of scholars to fully account for the rise of protest in the Arab world stems mostly 
from a methodological shortcoming that is caused by the absence of appropriate data. As several 
authors argue, in order to truly explain a rise in protest, there is a need to account for a change in 
incentives over time (Opp 2009; Muller and Opp 1986). Cross-sectional surveys and retrospective 
interviews pose serious limitations for the drawing of decisive conclusions regarding the effects of 
incentives on protest. Therefore, future research should attempt to engage more in panel surveys, 
where individuals and their incentives can be evaluated over time. 
Furthermore, research should address the relationship between macro and micro factors more 
explicitly. While this thesis only touched upon the tip of the iceberg of this relationship, a more 
rigorous and extensive analysis of the relationship between these different levels is essential. Not only 
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for our understanding of the rise in protest – but for other social phenomena that drive the world we 
live in.  
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Appendix1: Questions from the Arab Barometer 
 
Q101: How would you evaluate the current economic situation in your country? 1. Very good 2. Good 
3. Bad 4. Very Bad. 
Q102: What do you think will be the economic situation in your country during the next few years (3-
5 years) compared to the current situation? 1. Much better 2. Somewhat better 
3. Almost the same as the current situation 4. Somewhat worse 5. Much worse. 
Q204(2): I am going to ask a number of questions related to the current government’s performance. 
How would you evaluate the performance of the current government’s [Creating employment 
opportunities]? 1. Very good 2. Good 3. Bad 4. Very Bad. 
Q210: Do you think that there is corruption within the state’s institutions and agencies? 1. Yes 2. No. 
Q409: Do you use the internet…? 1. Daily or almost daily 2. At least once a week 3. At least once a 
month 4. A few times a year 5. I do not use the internet. 
Q513: Suppose that there was a scale from 1-10 to measure the extent of your satisfaction with the 
government, in which 1 means that you were absolutely unsatisfied with its performance and 10 means 
that you were very satisfied, to what extent are you satisfied with the government’s performance? 
Q517: I will describe different political systems to you, and I want to ask you about your opinion of 
each one of them with regard to the country’s governance – for each one would you say it is very 
good, good, bad, or very bad?  
1. A democratic political system (public freedoms, guarantees equality in political and civil 
rights, alternation of power, and accountability and transparency of the executive authority). 
2. A political system with an authoritarian president (non-democratic) who is indifferent to 
parliament and elections. 
Q1001: Age…. 
Q1002: Gender: 1. Male 2. Female 
Q1003: Level of Education: 1. Illiterate/Literate 2. Elementary. 3. Preparatory/Basic. 4. Secondary. 5. 
Mid-level diploma/professional or technical. 6. BA 7. MA and above 
Q1005: are you? 1. Retired  2. A housewife  3. A student  5. Unemployed (looking for work)  
Q1016: I will read you some statements related to your household income. Which of these statements 
comes closest to describing your household income? 1. Our household income covers our expenses 
well and we are able to save. 2. Our household income covers our expenses without notable 
difficulties. 3. Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face some difficulties in 
meeting our needs. 4. Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face significant 
difficulties in meeting our needs. 
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